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Abstract
Will low-skilled workers be replaced by automation? To answer this question,
we set up a search and matching model that features two skill types of workers
and includes automation capital as an additional production factor. Automation
capital is a perfect substitute for low-skilled workers and an imperfect substitute
for high-skilled workers. Using this type of model, we show that the accumulation
of automation capital decreases the labor market tightness in the low-skilled labor
market and increases the labor market tightness in the high-skilled labor market.
This leads to a rising unemployment rate of low-skilled workers and a falling un-
employment rate of high-skilled workers. In addition, automation leads to falling
wages of low-skilled workers and rising wages of high-skilled workers.
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1 Introduction
Reports in the news show on a daily basis that robots are outcompeting humans on
more and more tasks (see, for example, The Economist, 2014, 2017; Davison, 2017). This
holds true even for tasks that were seen as unautomatable just a few years ago. While
industrial robots are substituting for assembly line workers in the automotive industry
since decades, recent years are characterized by advances in driverless cars and trucks,
diagnosing diseases, producing customized parts and medical implants, writing novels,
and even doing science (National Science Foundation, 2009; Schmidt and Lipson, 2009;
Barrie, 2014; Abeliansky et al., 2015; Ford, 2015).
Ever since the publication of the working paper version of Frey and Osborne (2013,
2017), who claim that 47% of the jobs in the United States are highly susceptible to
computerization over the coming two decades, policymakers, economists, and the general
public have been concerned about mass unemployment in the age of automation. However,
these high numbers are criticized for various reasons. For example, Arntz et al. (2016)
argue that specific tasks get automated but not whole jobs. They incorporate this insight
into the method used by Frey and Osborne (2013, 2017) and calculate that only 9% of
all jobs in the United States can be automated in the near future when assuming such
a task-based perspective. In addition, there are compensating mechanisms in actually
existing economies such as i) decreasing prices of the goods that are produced in an
automated manner such that spending on goods and services that are produced by humans
might increase, or ii) an increase in the production of robots and 3D printers that might
require additional human labor. On top of these arguments, Bloom et al. (2018) take
into account that building robots is costly and takes time. Thus, not all jobs that could
be substituted by robots from a technical perspective will indeed vanish soon. Instead,
economic considerations need to be taken into account because often it will not pay off for
firms to substitute cheap labor by expensive robots. Bloom et al. (2018) calculate that
the predicted evolution of the stock of industrial robots according to the International
Federation of Robotics (2017) together with the estimates of Acemoglu and Restrepo
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(2017) that one industrial robot substitutes for around six workers, implies the loss of
approximately 60 million jobs worldwide until 2030. While these numbers are nowhere
near the 47% of all jobs mentioned by Frey and Osborne (2013, 2017), they are nevertheless
large and give rise to some concern. Thus, it is important to analyze the pathways by
which robots have the potential to lead to technological unemployment within the modern
literature on the determinants of endogenous unemployment levels.
Most recently, He´mous and Olsen (2016) and Acemoglu and Restrepo (2016) pioneered
the analysis of the effects of automation on economic growth and inequality within the
R&D-based growth literature. In He´mous and Olsen (2016), final goods are produced us-
ing a variety of intermediate goods, while in Acemoglu and Restrepo (2016), final goods
are produced using a variety of tasks. In both papers the intermediate varieties/tasks are
either produced by labor or by labor-replacing machines. R&D-driven innovation leads
to new varieties/tasks that always come into existence as un-automated and, thus, have
to be produced by human labor. Firms then decide whether to make investments to
automate the production of their intermediate variety/task. Along the balanced growth
path, there is always a constant range of goods/tasks that are produced by low-skilled
workers. As a consequence, technological unemployment is less of a concern in the long
run. The wages of low-skilled workers rise due to innovation because a higher rate of
creation of intermediate goods/tasks raises the range of these goods/tasks that are pro-
duced by low-skilled labor. Even more productive automation could lead to higher wages
for low-skilled workers because it encourages more innovation. In both contributions,
technological unemployment is not at the focus.
As far as the theoretical underpinnings of changing unemployment in the age of au-
tomation are concerned, Prettner and Strulik (2017) explore some potential channels.
They propose an R&D driven growth model in which new technologies are labor-replacing
robots that substitute for low-skilled workers. High-skilled workers are either engineers in
the final goods sector or scientists in the R&D sector. Low-skilled workers are employed
at assembly lines in the final goods sector. As a consequence, the wages of low-skilled
workers stagnate in the face of automation, whereas the wages of high-skilled workers
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rise. In their model, equilibrium voluntary unemployment will result if there exists a
social safety net that is financed out of a wage tax on low-skilled and high-skilled workers.
The reason is that the outside option for low-skilled workers becomes more attractive over
time because the wages of low-skilled workers stagnate, while the social security benefits
rise due to the contributions of high-skilled workers.
In an extension of the model, Prettner and Strulik (2017) show that even involuntary
equilibrium unemployment is possible in such a setting. The argument is rooted in the fair
wage theory based on Akerlof and Jellen (1990): individuals compare their own wages with
those of their peers and perceive their wage as unfair if it lies below a weighted average
of their own market clearing wage and the wage of their reference group on the labor
market. If workers perceive their wage as unfair, they do not entail full effort at work.
The wages of high-skilled workers, which constitute the reference group for low-skilled
workers, are higher than the wages of low-skilled workers. Thus, the wages of low-skilled
workers that are perceived as fair have to be higher than their market clearing wages
to induce full effort of low-skilled workers. At this wage rate, more low-skilled workers
seek jobs than firms are willing to provide. Thus, there is involuntary unemployment of
low-skilled workers in equilibrium.
The discussions so far show that equilibrium unemployment in the age of automa-
tion can take the form of voluntary unemployment and involuntary unemployment based
on fair wage considerations. We aim at contributing to this debate by introducing au-
tomation into the modern search and matching theory of frictional unemployment based
on Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and Pissarides (2000). Assuming that low-skilled
workers are easier to substitute than high-skilled workers, which is the empirically rel-
evant case up to now, we show that automation leads to higher equilibrium wages of
high-skilled workers and to a tighter high-skilled labor market. The reverse holds true for
low-skilled workers. As a consequence, unemployment of low-skilled workers rises, while
unemployment of high-skilled workers falls.
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the related literature on
automation and search and matching models. Section 3 contains the description of the
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model. In Section 4, we derive our analytical results, and in Section 5, we conclude, draw
potential lessons for policy makers, and discuss promising future research avenues.
2 Related Literature
Our paper builds upon the literature on automation and the search and matching theory
of the labor market. As far as automation is concerned, Steigum (2011) and Prettner
(2018) augment the standard neoclassical growth models of Solow (1956), Cass (1965),
and Koopmans (1965) by a production factor that is a perfect substitute for labor, while
it is accumulated similar to physical capital. They show that this automation capital has
the potential to lift an economy out of the traditional stagnation steady state even in
the absence of technological progress. The reason is that automation capital makes the
production factor labor accumulable such that the Cobb-Douglas production technology
is transformed endogenously into an AK production technology. Thus, the possibility for
long-run economic growth emerges in the neoclassical growth model, which has consider-
able consequences for welfare in the long run.
While the long-run implications of capital accumulation for economic growth are strik-
ingly similar in the models of Solow (1956), Cass (1965), and Koopmans (1965) on the
one hand, and in the overlapping generations model of Diamond (1965) on the other
hand, their implications on the growth effects of automation are the opposite of each
other. Sachs and Kotlikoff (2012), Benzell et al. (2015), and Sachs et al. (2015) show
numerically that long-run stagnation emerges in an overlapping generations model with
automation. Gasteiger and Prettner (2017) provide an analytical explanation for this
finding. Since individuals save exclusively out of wage income in the overlapping gener-
ations model and automation reduces wages, there is a vicious circle that prevents the
economy from taking off. In the standard neoclassical growth framework of Solow (1956),
Cass (1965), and Koopmans (1965), by contrast, individuals save out of wage income and
out of capital income. Thus, a similar vicious circle is not present in these types of models
with automation such that long-run growth is feasible.
4
Irrespective of whether automation is analyzed in the neoclassical growth models of
Solow (1956), Cass (1965), and Koopmans (1965) or in the overlapping generations model
of Diamond (1965), the distributional effects of automation are similar. Since automation
substitutes for workers but the income of robots flows to capital owners, the capital
income share of the economy rises, which is consistent with the stylized facts over the last
decades (Elsby et al., 2013; Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2014). The fact that wealth is
more concentrated than income implies that the automation-induced rise in the capital
income share contributes to a rise in overall income inequality (cf. Piketty, 2014; Krusell
and Smith, 2015). At the same time, low-skilled workers are still more susceptible to
automation than high-skilled workers such that automation leads to a rising skill premium
and thereby raises wage inequality (He´mous and Olsen, 2016; Acemoglu and Restrepo,
2016; Prettner and Strulik, 2017; Lankisch et al., 2017).
While there seems to be a consensus that automation will lead to higher inequality, the
effects on unemployment are still subject to considerable debates. To gain deeper insights
from a theoretical perspective on the endogenous evolution of involuntary unemployment,
it is necessary to consider the search and matching model a` la Mortensen and Pissarides
(1994) and Pissarides (2000). In this type of models, unemployment emerges due to search
frictions in the labor market. Assuming such a search and matching based perspective
allows us to derive the effects of an increase in the stock of robots on the employment
structure via its impact on job creation and the job search behavior of workers that
responds endogenously. To our best knowledge, this is the first paper that studies the
effects of automation on skill-specific involuntary frictional unemployment.
The contributions of Chassamboulli and Palivos (2013, 2014), Fadinger and Mayr
(2014), and Battisti et al. (2017) are related to ours because they use a similar method-
ological framework. While Fadinger and Mayr (2014) endogenize the state of technology
and study the effects of a change in skill endowments, the other articles analyze the im-
pact of skill-specific immigration. All of these articles share important elements with our
paper, such as the existence of two separate labor markets, one for high-skilled workers
and one for low-skilled workers, and a similar production structure according to which
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the final good is produced based on a CES production function, while the intermediate
goods are produced by high-skilled and low-skilled labor based on a linear technology.
The decisive difference to these contributions lies at the level of the exogenous shock.
While low-skilled immigration substitutes for low-skilled natives in the production of the
low-skill intermediate good in Chassamboulli and Palivos (2013, 2014) and Battisti et al.
(2017), automation capital appears in the production function of the final good and sub-
stitutes for the low-skilled intensive intermediate good in our paper. Taking taxi drivers
as an example, low-skilled immigrants may substitute for low-skilled natives as drivers.
However, self-driving cars (automation capital) will be able to replace the occupation
group of taxi drivers altogether in the not too distant future. This aspect cannot be
analyzed without the presence of the new production factor of automation capital.
3 The Model
Consider an economy in which workers have two different skill levels i = {L,H}, where
L denotes low-skilled individuals and H denotes high-skilled individuals. The skills are
distributed exogenously on a two-point distribution: the fraction λ of the population is
low skilled, while the remaining fraction 1−λ is high skilled. Normalizing the population
size to unity implies that the population shares of a particular skill level are equal to
the numbers of low-skilled workers and high-skilled workers, respectively. Time evolves
continuously and workers can be in either of two states: employed or unemployed. Workers
live indefinitely, are risk neutral, discount the future at the constant rate r > 0, and cannot
choose to switch their skill level, i.e., education is exogenous and fixed.
3.1 Production Technology
Three goods are produced in the economy. A final consumption good Y and two in-
termediate goods YH and YL that are used in the production of the final good. Each
high-skilled worker produces one unit of the intermediate good YH and each low-skilled
worker produces one unit of the intermediate good YL. Due to this structure, there is no
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need to distinguish between the employment level of a given skill type i and the output
of the corresponding intermediate good i, thus, YH ≡ H and YL ≡ L. From now on, we
refer to the intermediate goods produced by low-skilled workers as low-skilled intensive
and to the intermediate goods produced by high-skilled workers as high-skilled intensive.
Apart from high-skilled and low-skilled labor, there are two other production factors:
traditional physical capital in the form of machines, assembly lines, and factory buildings,
which is denoted byK, and automation capital in the form of industrial robots, self-driving
cars, 3D printers, etc. which is denoted by P for “programmable labor.” Automation
capital is a perfect substitute for low-skilled workers and an imperfect substitute for high-
skilled workers (cf. Lankisch et al., 2017). The CES production function of the final good
is given by
Y = AKα[γ(L+ P )σ + (1− γ)Hσ] 1−ασ , (1)
where α denotes the elasticity of output with respect to traditional capital, γ ∈ (0, 1)
refers to the production weight of low-skilled intermediates and of programmable labor,
σ ∈ (−∞, 1] determines the substitutability between both types of workers, and A is an
efficiency parameter. From now on, we focus on the empirically relevant case σ ∈ (0, 1), in
which low-skilled and high-skilled workers are gross substitutes (Autor, 2002; Acemoglu,
2009).
All of the three goods are sold in competitive markets and we use the price of the final
good as the nume´raire, implying that the prices of the two intermediate goods pH and pL
are equal to their marginal products. Hence, we have pH = ∂Y/∂H and pL = ∂Y/∂L.
Furthermore, firms can buy and sell traditional capital on a competitive capital market
without delay. Thus, it holds that pK = ∂Y/∂K = r+δ, where δ denotes the depreciation
rate of traditional capital. Differentiating Equation (1) and using pK = ∂Y/∂K = r + δ,
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the prices of the two intermediate goods are given by1
pL = (1− α)γA 11−α
(
α
r + δ
) α
1−α
[
(1− γ)
(
H
L+ P
)σ
+ γ
] 1−σ
σ
, (2)
pH = (1− α)(1− γ)A 11−α
(
α
r + δ
) α
1−α
[
(1− γ) + γ
(
L+ P
H
)σ] 1−σσ
. (3)
If the rate of return on automation capital would be lower than the rate of return on
traditional capital, rational investors would only invest in traditional capital, and vice
versa. For an interior equilibrium to exist, it needs to be the case that both types of
investments deliver the same rate of return. Thus, it holds that pK = pP = r + δ, with
pP being the price of automation capital.
We immediately see that – for the empirically relevant range of σ – an increase in the
number of high-skilled workers increases the price of the goods produced by low-skilled
workers and reduces the price of the goods produced by high-skilled workers. In case of
an increase in the number of low-skilled workers, the reverse is true. We show later how
an increase in P affects the prices of the high-skilled and low-skilled intensive good.
3.2 Labor Market
There are two separate labor markets, one for high-skilled labor and one for low-skilled
labor. High-skilled workers direct their job search only to the high-skill intensive sector,
while low-skilled workers direct their search only to the low-skill intensive sector (see, for
example, Belan et al., 2010; Chassamboulli and Palivos, 2013, 2014; Hagedorn et al., 2016;
Battisti et al., 2017; Liu et al., 2017). The matching function of firm i can be formally
described by
Mi = M(Vi, Ui), (4)
where Mi denotes the instantaneous flow of hires, Vi refers to the number of vacancies that
are posted, Ui is the number of job-searchers, which equals the number of unemployed
1In Appendix A.1, we provide the detailed calculations.
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workers, and the function M(·, ·) exhibits constant returns to scale, is increasing in both
arguments, at least twice differentiable, and satisfies the Inada conditions. The arrival
rate of any worker per vacancy is M(Vi, Ui)/Vi ≡ m(θi), where θi ≡ Vi/Ui measures the
labor market tightness in terms of the number of vacancies per unemployed person in
the economy. From these expressions it follows immediately that the arrival rate of any
vacancy per unemployed worker is M(Vi, Ui)/Ui ≡ θim(θi). As a consequence, the arrival
rate for firms decreases in θi, whereas the arrival rate for workers increases in θi.
3.3 Firms
In line with the literature, the firms that produce in the intermediate goods sector are
small and each firm offers only one job (see, for example, Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994;
Albrecht and Vroman, 2002; Dolado et al., 2009; Gautier et al., 2010).2 The number of
firms is determined endogenously in equilibrium. Firms i = {H,L} can either post a high-
tech vacancy, which is only suited for high-skilled workers, or a low-tech vacancy, which
is only suited for low-skilled workers. The value functions of the firms differ according
to whether the firm has filled the vacancy or not. If the firm has filled the vacancy, it
produces the corresponding good i = {H,L} and sells it on the market for the price pi.
The firm pays the wage wi to its workers and with a probability (1 − si) the vacancy is
still filled in the next period, such that si is the exogenous rate of job destruction. With
this structure it is obvious that the value function of a firm with a filled vacancy is given
by
rΠFi = pi − wi + si(ΠVi − ΠFi ). (5)
By contrast, a firm that does not fill the vacancy has no labor costs and no revenues
but has to pay costs for a vacancy (e.g., job advertisement cost), which are denoted by
hi. With the probability m(θi) the firm manages to fill the vacancy such that its value
2Pissarides (2000) shows that the outcome of the single-worker model is equivalent to a model with
large firms that face adjustment costs of employment.
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function is given by
rΠVi = −hi +m(θi)(ΠFi − ΠVi ). (6)
3.4 Workers
The behavior of workers can be analyzed in a similar vein as the behavior of firms. Workers
who are employed receive the wage wi and become unemployed in the next instant with
the probability si. Thus, the value function of an employed worker is given by
rΨEi = wi + si(Ψ
U
i −ΨEi ). (7)
An unemployed person receives a flow benefit zi while being unemployed. This flow benefit
includes the opportunity costs of employment such as unemployment benefits, leisure, and
the potential income generated by home production. With the probability of finding a
job being equal to θim(θi), the value function of an unemployed person is given by
rΨUi = zi + θim(θi)(Ψ
E
i −ΨUi ). (8)
4 Solution of the Model
In this section, we solve the model, describe the steady-state solution, and provide the
comparative statics analysis with respect to the effects of the accumulation of automation
capital on unemployment and wages of high-skilled and low-skilled workers, respectively.
4.1 Wage Determination
Since the workers strictly prefer being employed to being unemployed and the firms strictly
prefer a filled vacancy to the situation of an unfilled vacancy, there is a surplus to be gained
from a successful match. We follow the literature and assume that the firm and the worker
bargain over the distribution of the surplus from the match in a cooperative bargaining
process (see, for example, Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994, 1999; Pissarides, 2000; Gautier,
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2002). Once a worker of type i and a firm with the same skill requirements meet each
other, they solve a generalized Nash bargaining problem given by
max
wi
{
ΨEi −ΨUi
}β
·
{
ΠFi − ΠVi
}1−β
, (9)
where β ∈ (0, 1) represents the bargaining power of the worker. Maximizing the Nash
product provides us with the equilibrium expression for the wage rate as given by
wi = zi + (pi − zi) · Γ(θi), (10)
with
Γ(θi) = β
r + si + θim(θi)
r + si + θim(θi)β
.
Thus, the wage is set as a mark-up over the income enjoyed while being unemployed. The
mark-up itself consists of two parts. The first part is the profit that a firm earns if it fills a
vacancy with an employee who only earns the outside option zi. This is the largest possible
overall profit a firm could make. Second, the term Γ(θi) provides the effective bargaining
power of the workers as described by Cahuc et al. (2014). This term refers to those part
of the largest possible overall profit that a firm can make by filling a vacancy that the
workers are able to appropriate by negotiation. As is intuitive, this bargaining power
rises with the bargaining weight of the workers (β) and with the labor market tightness
(θ), whereas it decreases with the job destruction rate (si). Appendix A.2 provides the
detailed calculations regarding the derivation of the wage rate.
4.2 Labor Demand and Employment
Firms enter the market and open their vacancies as long as the expected profit of posting
a vacancy is positive. Free market entry drives the expected profit of a vacancy down to
zero such that
ΠVi = 0 (11)
holds at the long-run equilibrium. Further, the present value function of a filled job,
Equation (5), is used and combined with the equilibrium wage level wi to obtain the
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following labor demand:
hi
m(θi)
= (1− β) (pi − zi)
r + si + θim(θi)β
. (12)
Thus, the expected costs of creating a vacancy equal the expected profit of a filled job.
At a steady-state equilibrium, the flows in and out of unemployment have to be equal,
i.e., U˙i = 0. Using that the number of low-skilled workers in the economy is given by
λ = UL + L, with UL being the number of unemployed low-skilled workers, while the
number of high-skilled workers is given by 1 − λ = UH + H, with UH being the number
of unemployed high-skilled workers, the steady-state unemployment rates ui are given by
UL
λ
= uL =
sL
sL + θLm(θL)
(13)
and
UH
1− λ = uH =
sH
sH + θHm(θH)
. (14)
Analogously, the employment levels are
L = λ
θLm(θL)
sL + θLm(θL)
(15)
and
H = (1− λ) θHm(θH)
sH + θHm(θH)
. (16)
4.3 Effects of the Accumulation of Automation Capital
Before we start deriving and discussing the central results, we define the steady-state
equilibrium of the economy.
Definition 1. A steady-state equilibrium of our search and matching model with au-
tomation and skill heterogeneity is characterized by a stationary economy in which the
key endogenous variables
{
θi, pi, pk, wi, H, L,K, ui
}
are determined by the following equa-
tions:
(i) the flow Equations (13) to (16),
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(ii) the prices of the two intermediates as given by Equations (2) and (3) and of capital
as given by pk = r + δ = αY/K,
(iii) the wage rates as given by Equation (10),
(iv) labor demand for each skill level as given by Equation (12).
Next, we state the central results of our model in the following three propositions.
The first proposition describes the effects of automation capital on labor market tightness
in the low-skilled labor market and in the high-skilled labor market, respectively.
Proposition 1. The accumulation of automation capital P decreases the labor market
tightness in the low-skilled labor market and increases the labor-market tightness in the
high-skilled labor market.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.1 for the formal proof.
To provide an intuition for this result, we make use of the fact that an increase in the
stock of robots P reduces the price of goods produced by low-skilled workers and raises
the price of the goods produced by high-skilled workers. This gives rise to the following
lemma.
Lemma 1. An increase in the stock of robots P reduces the price of goods produced by
low-skilled workers and raises the price of the goods produced by high-skilled workers.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.2 for the formal proof.
An increase in the number of robots leads to a substitution of the goods that are
produced with low-skilled labor by robots in final goods production. Thus, the price of the
goods produced by low-skilled workers decreases, which leads to lower profits of the firms
that produce low-skilled intensive goods. This in turn reduces the number of firms that
produce low-skilled intensive goods at the steady-state equilibrium and therefore reduces
the overall flow of low-skilled vacancies for a given number of low-skilled workers. Thus,
labor market tightness decreases for low-skilled workers. By contrast, the demand of the
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final goods sector for intermediate goods produced by high-skilled workers increases, which
raises the price of high-skilled intensive goods and hence the profits of firms producing
these goods. The reason is that H and P are imperfect substitutes, implying that the price
of the high-skilled intermediate good depends positively on the amount of automation and
negatively on the amount of high-skilled labor. At the steady-state equilibrium, there will
then be firm entry into the high-skilled intensive goods production such that the flow of
vacancies for a given number of high-skilled workers increases. This, in turn, raises the
tightness of the high-skilled labor market.
The second proposition describes the effects of automation capital on the unemploy-
ment rates of both types of skills.
Proposition 2. The accumulation of automation capital P increases the unemployment
rate of low-skilled workers and decreases the unemployment rate of high-skilled workers.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.3 for the formal proof.
This result is a consequence of the results obtained in Proposition 1. Labor market
tightness increases for high-skilled workers as automation progresses, while labor market
tightness decreases for low-skilled workers. As a consequence, the job finding probability of
high-skilled workers increases, while that of low-skilled workers decreases, which, in turn,
lowers the unemployment rate of low-skilled workers and increases the unemployment rate
of high-skilled workers.
The third proposition describes the effects of automation capital on the wage rates of
both types of workers.
Proposition 3. The accumulation of automation capital P decreases the wage rate of
low-skilled workers and increases the wage rate of high-skilled workers.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.4 for the formal proof.
This result is a consequence of the previously obtained results. We have seen already
that the marginal product of the low-skilled intensive good in final goods production
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decreases once that automation is accounted for, while the marginal product of the high-
skilled intensive good in final goods production increases. The increase in the price of
the goods produced by high-skilled workers leads to a higher match surplus for high-tech
firms, which induces vacancy posting and raises labor market tightness in that sector. The
so induced increase in the job-finding probability of high-skilled workers improves their
outside option and strengthens their bargaining position, which in turn raises their wage
rate. For low-skilled workers, the opposite results emerge. This channel is known from
the immigration literature, where a similar production function of the final good implies
that low-skilled immigrants are perfect substitutes for low-skilled natives and imperfect
substitutes for high-skilled native workers (see, for example, Chassamboulli and Palivos,
2013, 2014; Chassamboulli and Peri, 2015; Liu et al., 2017).
5 Conclusions
We use automation capital as an additional production factor and embed it in the standard
search and matching model augmented by skill heterogeneity, imperfect substitutability
between high-skilled workers and low-skilled workers, and different search costs and job
destruction rates across skill levels. In our setting, automation capital is a perfect sub-
stitute for low-skilled labor and an imperfect substitute for high-skilled labor. Using this
structure, we are able to analyze how an increase in the stock of robots effects wage
inequality and involuntary unemployment across skill levels. We show that the accumu-
lation of automation capital decreases the labor market tightness in the low-skilled labor
market and increases the labor-market tightness in the high-skilled labor market. This
leads to a rising unemployment rate of low-skilled workers and a falling unemployment
rate of high-skilled workers. In addition, automation leads to falling wages of low-skilled
workers and rising wages of high-skilled workers.
Previous contributions have clarified that higher unemployment due to automation
could come in the form of i) higher voluntary unemployment if the wages of low-skilled
workers stagnate in the wake of automation, while welfare benefits rise with the average
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wage, and ii) in the form of higher involuntary unemployment if low-skilled workers per-
ceive their wage as unfair and react by exerting less effort. Then firms would need to raise
the wages for low-skilled workers above their marginal productivity to induce low-skilled
workers to exert full effort. In this situation, equilibrium unemployment would result. In
our contribution, we clarify that also higher frictional unemployment might be a result of
automation.
From a policy perspective, the issue of higher frictional unemployment could be ad-
dressed by i) raising the efficiency of the search process, ii) making sure to raise the
fraction of individuals who are skilled by investing in higher education and retraining
programs, and iii) potentially one could think about public employment programs for
low-skilled workers who are negatively affected by automation and for whom retraining
programs do not work appropriately. Such a program might put long-term unemployed
into publicly paid jobs at the community level that would not be profitable for private
firms like cleaning parks, spending time with the elderly, etc. These programs might be
a good alternative for the long-term unemployed who are cut off of the labor market,
because the net costs are just the top-up on the unemployment benefits and there might
be positive side effects apart from the benefit of the work done for the community. These
positive side effects might come in the form of higher levels of self-esteem of the persons
enrolled in such schemes, staying better integrated in the society via the connections in
the community and at the workplace, and of not losing certain basic skills.
In the current setting, we abstract from endogenous education decisions such that
individuals cannot switch from being low skilled to being high skilled subject to invest-
ment costs as in Prettner and Strulik (2017). Introducing such an endogenous education
decision could yield additional insights into the long-run adjustment dynamics to rising
technological unemployment. In addition, it might be interesting to introduce a service
sector in which low-skilled workers could also find work and might not yet be threatened
to get replaced by automation capital to a similar extent as in manufacturing. Another
promising avenue for further research would be to introduce the search and matching
structure into an R&D-based growth model to endogenize the evolution of automation.
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A Appendix
A.1 Prices of the Intermediate Goods
Differentiating the production function, Equation (1), with respect to the number of high-
skilled workers, with respect to the number of low-skilled workers, and with respect to
traditional capital yields
∂Y
∂H
= pH = Y (1− α)(1− γ)Hσ−1
[
(1− γ)Hσ + γ(L+ P )σ
]−1
, (17)
∂Y
∂L
= pL = Y (1− α)γ(L+ P )σ−1
[
(1− γ)Hσ + γ(L+ P )σ
]−1
, (18)
∂Y
∂K
= pK = αAK
α−1
[
(1− γ)Hσ + γ(L+ P )σ
] 1−α
σ
. (19)
Solving Equation (19) for K and using pK = r + δ provides us with
K =
( αA
r + δ
) 1
1−α
[
(1− γ)Hσ + γ(L+ P )σ
] 1
σ
. (20)
Next, we divide Equations (17) and (18) by pK = αY/K, which can be derived by
collecting terms in Equation (19). This yields
pH
pK
=
1− α
α
(1− γ)Hσ−1K
[
(1− γ)Hσ + γ(L+ P )σ
]−1
, (21)
pL
pK
=
1− α
α
γ(L+ P )σ−1K
[
(1− γ)Hσ + γ(L+ P )σ
]−1
. (22)
Substituting Equation (20) in Equations (21) and (22), using pK = r+ δ, and rearranging
leads to the prices of the two intermediate goods as given by Equations (2) and (3):
pL = (1− α)γA 11−α
(
α
r + δ
) α
1−α
[
(1− γ)
(
H
L+ P
)σ
+ γ
] 1−σ
σ
,
pH = (1− α)(1− γ)A 11−α
(
α
r + δ
) α
1−α
[
(1− γ) + γ
(
L+ P
H
)σ] 1−σσ
.
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A.2 Wage Determination
Once a worker and a firm with the same skill requirements meet, they bargain over the
wage rate. They solve the generalized Nash-bargaining problem given by
max
wi
{
ΨEi −ΨUi
}β
·
{
ΠFi − ΠVi
}1−β
. (23)
Maximization of the Nash product delivers the sharing rule
β[ΠFi − ΠVi ] = (1− β)[ΨEi −ΨUi ]. (24)
Using the present value functions, Equations (5) and (7), together with the free entry
condition ΠVi = 0, the rents of firms and workers can be derived as
ΨEi −ΨUi =
wi − rΨUi
r + si
and ΠFi − ΠVi =
pi − wi
r + si
. (25)
Substituting Equation (25) in Equation (24) and rearranging leads to
wi = βpi + (1− β)rΨUi . (26)
The wages are the weighted sum of the worker’s productivity and the value of unemploy-
ment. The weights are given by the bargaining power of the respective participant in
the negotiations. Next, ΨEi − ΨUi has to be substituted in the present value function for
unemployed workers, Equation (8). For the substitution, the sharing rule (24) is used.
This yields
ΨEi −ΨUi = β · S, (27)
with S = (ΨEi −ΨUi )+(ΠFi −ΠVi ) being the surplus of a match of the respective bargaining
parties. Using Equation (25), it turns out that
ΨEi −ΨUi = β
(pi − rΨUi
r + si
)
. (28)
Substituting Equation (28) in Equation (8), the expected value of being unemployed is
rΨUi =
zi(r + si) + piθim(θi)β
r + si + θim(θi)β
. (29)
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Finally, inserting Equation (29) into Equation (26) and rearranging leads to the wage rate
given in Equation (10)
wi = zi + (pi − zi) · Γ(θi),
with
Γ(θi) = β
r + si + θim(θi)
r + si + θim(θi)β
.
A.3 Effects of the Accumulation of Automation Capital P
To see how the wage rates of workers, their employment levels, and their unemployment
rates change due to the accumulation of automation capital, it is necessary to derive how
the labor market tightness in each labor market is affected by an increase in P . We
do this by calculating the total differential of Equation (12) for each labor market and
thereby proof Proposition 1 in Section A.3.1. Afterwards, we proof Propositions 2 and
3. However, before we can derive the change in wage rates in Section A.3.3, it is first
necessary to derive the change in the prices of the two intermediate goods as given by
Equations (2) and (3) and as stated in Lemma 1. Section A.3.2 contains the corresponding
proof.
A.3.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof of Proposition 1. In the low-skilled labor market we obtain
hL
m(θL)β
∂θLm(θL)
∂θL
− [r + sL + βθLm(θL)]m′(θL)
m(θL)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
C>0
dθL
dP
=
[
dH
dθH
dθH
dP
− H
L+ P
(
dL
dθL
dθL
dP
+ 1
)]
×
(1− β)(1− α)γA 11−α
(
α
r + δ
) α
1−α
(1− σ)(1− γ)
[
(1− γ)
(
H
L+ P
)σ
+ γ
] 1−2σ
σ
Hσ−1
(L+ P )σ︸ ︷︷ ︸
B>0
.
(30)
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Rearranging yields [
C +B
H
L+ P
dL
dθL
]
dθL
dP
= B
[
dH
dθH
dθH
dP
− H
L+ P
]
. (31)
Analogously, the total differential in the high-skilled labor market is given by
hH
m(θH)β
∂θHm(θH)
∂θH
− [r + sH + βθHm(θH)]m′(θH)
m(θH)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
D>0
dθH
dP
=
[
− L+ P
H
dH
dθH
dθH
dP
+
(
dL
dθL
dθL
dP
+ 1
)]
×
(1− β)(1− α)γA 11−α
(
α
r + δ
) α
1−α
(1− σ)(1− γ)
[
(1− γ) + γ
(
L+ P
H
)σ] 1−2σσ
(L+ P )σ−1
Hσ︸ ︷︷ ︸
B1>0
.
(32)
Rearranging yields
dθH
dP
=
B1
D +B1
L+P
H
dH
dθH
[
dL
dθL
dθL
dP
+ 1
]
. (33)
Substituting Equation (33) in Equation (31) and simplifying yields
dθL
dP
= − BD
C
(
D +B1
L+P
H
dH
dθH
)
+BD H
L+P
dL
dθL
H
L+ P
< 0. (34)
In the next step, we substitute Equation (34) in Equation (33) to obtain
dθH
dP
=
B1C
C
(
D +B1
L+P
H
dH
dθH
)
+BD H
L+P
dL
dθL
> 0. (35)
Equations (34) and (35) prove Proposition 1.
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A.3.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof of Lemma 1. For the price of the low-skill intensive intermediate good we obtain
dpL
dP
=
[
dH
dθH
dθH
dP
− H
L+ P
(
dL
dθL
dθL
dP
+ 1
)]
×
(1− α)γA 11−α
(
α
r + δ
) α
1−α
(1− σ)(1− γ)
[
(1− γ)
(
H
L+ P
)σ
+ γ
] 1−2σ
σ
Hσ−1
(L+ P )σ︸ ︷︷ ︸
B2>0
.
(36)
Inserting Equations (34) and (35) and simplifying yields
dpL
dP
= − B2CD
C
(
D +B1
L+P
H
dH
dθH
)
+BD H
L+P
dL
dθL
H
L+ P
< 0. (37)
The procedure for the price of the high-skill intensive intermediate good is similar. Total
differentiation yields
dpH
dP
=
[
− L+ P
H
dH
dθH
dθH
dP
+
(
dL
dθL
dθL
dP
+ 1
)]
×
(1− α)γA 11−α
(
α
r + δ
) α
1−α
(1− σ)(1− γ)
[
(1− γ) + γ
(
L+ P
H
)σ] 1−2σσ
(L+ P )σ−1
Hσ︸ ︷︷ ︸
B3>0
.
(38)
Substituting in Equations (34) and (35) and simplifying provides
dpH
dP
=
B3CD
C
(
D +B1
L+P
H
dH
dθH
)
+BD H
L+P
dL
dθL
> 0. (39)
Equations (37) and (39) prove Lemma 1.
A.3.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof of Proposition 2. Using the change in labor-market tightness in each labor market,
the change in the respective employment levels and unemployment rates, as given by
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Equations (13) - (16), can be easily derived as follows:
dL
dP
= λ
sL
[sL + θLm(θL)]2
∂θLm(θL)
∂θL
dθL
dP︸︷︷︸
<0
< 0 (40)
duL
dP
= − sL
[sL + θLm(θL)]2
∂θLm(θL)
∂θL
dθL
dP
> 0 (41)
dH
dP
= (1− λ) sH
[sH + θHm(θH)]2
∂θHm(θH)
∂θH
dθH
dP︸︷︷︸
>0
> 0 (42)
duH
dP
= − sH
[sH + θHm(θH)]2
∂θHm(θH)
∂θH
dθH
dP
< 0. (43)
Equations (41) and (43) prove Proposition 2.
A.3.4 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof of Proposition 3. Finally, we are able to derive the change in the wage rates. The
total differential of the wage rate [as given by Equation (10)] in each labor market is
dwL
dP
= Γ(θL)
dpL
dP︸︷︷︸
<0
+(pL − zL)(1− β) r + sL
[r + sL + βθLm(θL)]2
∂θLm(θL)
∂θL
dθL
dP︸︷︷︸
<0
< 0, (44)
dwH
dP
= Γ(θH)
dpH
dP︸︷︷︸
>0
+(pH − zH)(1− β) r + sH
[r + sH + βθHm(θH)]2
∂θHm(θH)
∂θH
dθH
dP︸︷︷︸
>0
> 0. (45)
This proves Proposition 3.
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